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The measurement of school effectiveness 
is a central feature of educational accountabil-
ity policies in all 50 US states and around the 
world. While school accountability measures 
are often based on test score levels (e.g., per-
cent proficient), critics argue that test score 
gains are a fairer way to judge schools’ contri-
butions to student achievement (e.g., Ladd and 
Walsh 2002, Ryan 2004). Such “value-added” 
measures (VAMs) have now been introduced 
into the accountability regimes of at least 30 
US states (Blank 2010). The growing interest in 
VAMs has given rise to a large literature which 
deals with technical issues such as model speci-
fication, choice of sample and outcome, and 
measurement error in the estimation of “school 
effects” (Raudenbush and Willms 1995; Meyer 
1997; McCaffrey et al. 2003; Rubin, Stuart, and 
Zanutto 2004; Reardon and Raudenbush 2009). 
Yet random variation in school attendance is 
both rare and necessary to test the validity of 
VAMs, and to guide the selection of models for 
measuring causal effects of schools.
In this paper I use data from a public school 
choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (CMS) 
to test the validity of school value-added  models. 
Students were guaranteed assignment to their 
neighborhood school but could apply to attend 
other schools in CMS, with admission to over-
subscribed schools determined by lottery. This 
yields random assignment to schools, albeit 
within a self-selected sample of applicants. I 
estimate a variety of school VAMs, varying 
the model specification, outcome, and sample 
on which VAM is calculated. I then use these 
nonexperimental estimates of “school effects” 
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to predict the impact of winning the lottery to 
attend a chosen school on student achievement.
Overall, I find that VAMs are a remarkably 
accurate out-of-sample predictor of student 
achievement. In specifications with minimal 
controls (i.e., one year of prior test scores and no 
other covariates) and two or more years of prior 
data, I fail to reject the hypothesis that school 
effects are unbiased. VAMs with a richer set of 
covariates perform similarly.
A few existing studies of “teacher effects” find 
that conditioning on prior test scores and other 
characteristics is sufficient to account for sort-
ing of students across teachers within a school (Kane and Staiger 2008; Chetty, Friedman, and 
Rockoff 2013; Kane et al. 2013). However, the 
assumptions of school VAMs require that the 
same covariates are sufficient to account for 
sorting of students across schools, which may 
be less likely to hold. A small existing literature 
compares the results from lottery-based admis-
sion to charter schools to results that use obser-
vational designs (Hoxby and Rockoff 2005; 
Abdulkadiro ˘    glu et al. 2011; Deutsch 2012; 
Angrist, Pathak, and Walters 2013). This work 
connects to the broader tradition in economics 
of comparing experimental to nonexperimental 
evaluation methods, beginning with LaLonde (1986). As pointed out by Rothstein (2010), 
quantifying the bias that arises from commonly 
used VAMs has important implications for edu-
cation policy. If high-stakes school account-
ability ratings are biased or inaccurate, they are 
unlikely to improve performance and may lead 
to wasteful compliance behavior (e.g., Baker 
2002).
I. Data and Value-Added Models
The main data source for this article is a panel 
of administrative data on all students enrolled 
in CMS from 1996 to 2004. These data contain 
detailed information on student demographics, 
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enrollment histories by school, grade, and year, 
and end-of-year (EOY) test scores in math and 
English language arts (ELA). Students are tested 
in grades 3 through 8 every year and in both 
subjects. I use test scores from the 1996–1997 
through 2001–2002 school years as the main 
covariates in our VAM estimation, and I use the 
2002–2003 and later test scores as outcomes.
I estimate school value-added models (VAMs) 
of the general form
(1)  A ijt =  X ijt β +  ω ijt ;  ω ijt = μ j +  θ jt +  ε ijt .
The dependent variable  A ijt is the state-standard-
ized EOY score in math or reading for student i 
in school j and year t.  X ijt is a vector of student-
level covariates, and  ω ijt is a residual term. The 
key parameter of interest is the “school effect” μ j , which can be obtained either by comput-
ing the average school-level residual (i.e., ran-
dom effects) or by direct estimation (i.e., fixed 
effects). VAMs rely on the covariate vector  X ijt to 
adjust for observed differences in student char-
acteristics across schools. Specifically, if assign-
ment to schools is uncorrelated with unobserved 
determinants of achievement conditional on the 
covariates in  X ijt ,  μ j can be interpreted as the 
causal impact of attending school j relative to 
the average school for a randomly chosen stu-
dent (e.g., Reardon and Raudenbush 2009). The 
addition of a lagged test score  A ijt−1 into the X 
vector is what gives the model a “value-added” 
interpretation, since we are asking whether test 
score gains are higher in some schools than 
 others. This setup closely follows the teacher 
effects literature (e.g., McCaffrey et al. 2004; 
Kane and Staiger 2008; Kane et al. 2013).
I introduce three sets of covariates into the 
X ijt vector. The first includes a year fixed effect 
but no other covariates, and essentially ranks 
schools by average test scores (in levels). The 
second specification includes only a third-order 
polynomial in the prior year’s reading and math 
scores. This model resembles the growth-based 
approach to school ratings used by several states. 
The third specification adds gender, race, free 
or reduced price lunch eligibility (a proxy for 
income based on the Federal poverty standard), 
and prior peer achievement. This emulates the 
traditional VAM approach used in previous 
work (e.g., McCaffrey et al. 2004; Kane and 
Staiger 2008).
In all models, I use data from prior years 
to predict the impact of attending a particu-
lar school in the year that the lottery was con-
ducted (2002–2003). To empirically assess the 
importance of using multiple years of data, I 
estimate VAMs with only one prior year of data (2001–2002), two prior years of data (2000 to 
2002), and then all five years that are available 
in the CMS panel (1997 to 2002). Three groups 
of covariates times three different samples 
equals nine different specifications with aver-
age test scores in the spring of 2003 as the main 
outcome.
Like Kane et al. (2013), I find that average 
residual and fixed effects approaches produce 
very similar results, and so I report only the 
results using the average residual (i.e., random 
effects) approach.1 I estimate equation (1) 
separately for grades 4 through 8, effectively 
 obtaining “school-by-grade” effects using mul-
tiple years of data.2 The main outcome of inter-
est is the average of a student’s standardized 
math and ELA score at the end of the indicated 
school year.3
Prior work on teacher effects has employed 
Empirical Bayes (also called shrinkage) esti-
mators, which attenuate teacher effects toward 
zero based on the amount of year-to-year varia-
tion in the estimate (e.g., McCaffrey et al. 2004; 
Kane and Staiger 2008; Kane et al. 2013).4 
1 Fixed effects models account for correlation between μ j 
and the covariates in  X ijt . However, since most of the varia-
tion in achievement is within schools rather than between 
schools, models with fixed effects and average residuals 
produced school effects that are correlated about 0.95 with 
a full set of covariates, and greater than 0.99 in more basic 
specifications. 
2 I also pursue an alternative approach that estimates a 
single school effect across multiple grades. Those results, 
which are available upon request, are similar in magnitude 
to the main results but much noisier.
3 While I can also estimate separate VAMs for math and 
ELA, the average score is preferable for two reasons. First, 
it increases precision. Second, and most important, school 
effectiveness is very likely to “spill over” across tests. As 
evidence, I note that the cross-subject, within-year cor-
relation between math and ELA school effects is usually 
between 0.5 and 0.6. This is almost always larger than the 
within-subject, across-year correlation, which averages 
closer to 0.4 for math and 0.25 for reading. Separate results 
for math and reading are available upon request.
4 We follow the procedure used in Kane and Staiger 
(2008), and in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) for 
the special case where μ j is assumed to be fixed over time 
and  θ jt and  ε ijt are i.i.d. In this case μ j is multiplied by the 
signal-to-noise ratio or “reliability,” which is essentially the 
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Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) modify 
this approach by allowing for a nonparametric 
autocovariance structure over past years of data, 
essentially allowing teacher effects to “drift” 
over time.5 I report unshrunken school effects as 
well as results from both methods of adjustment.
II. Comparison of Lottery Results 
to VAM Estimates
Here I provide only a very brief description 
of the CMS school choice lottery—for more 
details, see Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2010); 
Deming (2011); or Deming et al. (2014). 
Parents submitted their top three choices for 
other schools and were guaranteed admission 
to the neighborhood school. Admission was 
determined by random numbers within each lot-
tery, defined at the school-grade-priority group 
level, with a small number of different priority 
groups based on factors like sibling attendance. 
My analysis focuses on a sample of 2,599 stu-
dents in 118 separate lotteries with “marginal” 
priority groups. For these students, (i) the prob-
ability of admission was neither zero nor one, 
and (ii) assignment was determined only by 
a random number. Online Appendix Table A1 
compares the lottery sample to other students in 
CMS. Lottery applicants are fairly representa-
tive of their classmates on observed characteris-
tics, although they are somewhat more likely to 
be African-American and have modestly lower 
test scores.
I compare the actual impact of winning the 
lottery to the predicted impact that is implied by 
the school VAMs estimated in Section I above. 
To do this, I estimate
(2) VA M ij A = θ W ij VA M ij 1 + γ ( 1 −  W ij ) VA M ij N
 + π X ij +  Γ j +  ε ij 
(3)  A ij = δ ˆ VA M ijA + β  X ij +  Γ j +  ε ij .
 year-to-year variance in the school effect estimate divided by 
the total variance after correcting for school size.
5 In Kane and Staiger (2008) and other studies that use 
the Empirical Bayes approach, all prior years of data are 
weighed equally. In Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013), 
the “shrinkage” factor is estimated using the autocovariance 
of mean test score residuals across years. This allows for 
some prior years of data to be weighted more heavily. They 
find that more recent years are more predictive of future 
teacher effects.
Where VA M ij A is the VAM estimate for school 
j attended by student i in the fall of 2002, 
VA M ij 1 is the VAM estimate for the student’s first 
choice school, VA M ij N is the VAM estimate for 
the student’s neighborhood or “home” school, 
and  W ij is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if student i has a winning lottery number 
for admission to school j.  A ij are end-of-year (EOY) test scores in spring 2003,  X ij is a vector 
of prelottery covariates that is included only for 
improved precision,  Γ j is a set of lottery fixed 
effects, and  ε ij is a stochastic error term.6 To see 
the intuition for this specification, imagine that 
a student applies to a school which has an esti-
mated “value added” that is 0.1 standard devia-
tions (SDs) higher than their outside option, 
usually the neighborhood school.7 If the VAM 
estimate is a causal measure of the school’s 
impact on achievement, a student who wins the 
lottery will score 0.1 SDs higher on the test at 
the end of the year. In that case, the δ coefficient 
in equation (4) will have a value of exactly one, 
because the actual estimate exactly matches the 
impact on achievement that is predicted by the 
VAM estimate. Likewise, if the actual impact on 
achievement is somewhat less (say 0.05 SDs), 
the coefficient may be significantly greater than 
zero but also significantly less than one, imply-
ing some upward bias in the VAM estimate.
There are at least three reasons why VAM 
estimates may not predict the impacts of win-
ning the lottery. First, VAMs may be biased 
due to sorting on unobserved determinants of 
achievement (e.g., Rothstein 2010). Second, if 
“true” school effects vary over time independent 
of estimation error, then out-of-sample forecasts 
based on prior cohorts may be a poor predictor 
of future effectiveness. Third, since students in 
the lottery sample are self-selected, the impact 
6 Because the lotteries were conducted at the school-
grade-priority group level, the number of lotteries is greater 
than the number of schools. I suppress subscripts for grade 
and priority group for notational convenience. The Xij vec-
tor includes controls for race, gender, free or reduced 
price lunch, and a third-order polynomial in prior year 
(2001–2002) math and reading test scores plus indicator 
variables for missing scores. 
7 Most students who lost the lottery for their first choice 
ended up in their neighborhood school. However, we cannot 
observe the counterfactual school that lottery winners would 
have attended. As a sensitivity check, we construct counter-
factual “control” schools using students’ submitted choices 
combined with the ex post probability of admission. This 
procedure improves the accuracy of VAMs slightly. 
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of attending a school may be different for them 
than for a randomly chosen student from a prior 
cohort. Each of these reasons could lead to bias 
in either direction.
The main results of the paper are in Table 1. 
The first nine columns report results from differ-
ent VAM specifications, unadjusted for “shrink-
age”—three groups of covariates in the  X ij 
vector and three different estimations samples, 
as described in Section I. Columns 10 through 
12 show results that employ both the Empirical 
Bayes shrinkage method used in past work such 
as Kane and Staiger (2008) and the autocovari-
ance-adjusted “drift” procedure employed by 
Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013). I also 
report the standard deviation of the school 
effects estimates for each model. Because the 
VAM estimates are generated regressors, I block 
bootstrap the standard errors at the lottery level.
Columns 1 through 3 consider the accuracy 
of a VAM with no covariates at all, essentially 
asking whether winning the lottery to attend a 
school with higher test scores in levels increases 
student achievement. The coefficients are small 
and not significantly different from zero, sug-
gesting that average test scores alone contain 
almost no information about a school’s causal 
impact on achievement. Columns 4 through 
6 show results from the “gains” model, which 
includes only one year of prior test scores in the 
X ij vector. The performance of VAMs improves 
dramatically in these specifications. When we 
use only one year of prior data to estimate value 
added, controlling for prior scores increases the 
coefficient from 0.025 in column 1 to 0.531 in 
column 4. With two or more years of prior data, 
the VAM estimates are highly accurate (0.807 
and 0.966 in columns 5 and 6, respectively), 
and we fail to reject the hypothesis that they 
are biased (i.e., statistically different from one). 
Adding demographic covariates to the VAMs 
leads to slightly larger coefficients than in the 
gains specification.
Columns 10 through 12 show the impact of 
“shrinkage” adjustments on the forecasting 
accuracy of VAMs. When VAM estimates are 
based on only one year of prior data, adjustment 
for shrinkage improves the accuracy of the fore-
cast by about 18 percent (from 0.531 to 0.627). 
However, when I average the VAM estimates 
across multiple years, “shrinkage” adjustment 
actually reduces forecasting accuracy (1.237 
in column 9 compared to 1.602 in column 11). 
The “drift” adjustment, as in Chetty, Friedman, 
and Rockoff (2013), produces results that are 
slightly more accurate than unshrunken esti-
mates, and substantially more accurate than 
Empirical Bayes shrinkage.8
Online Appendix Table A2 tests for the per-
sistence of school effects estimates by compar-
ing the VAM for a student’s assigned school and 
grade to achievement outcomes in spring 2004, 
two years after the lottery. The second year 
VAM estimate is highly predictive of second 
year achievement. Moreover, when I include 
both the first and second year estimates together, 
I find evidence that first year school effects have 
a persistent impact on second year achieve-
ment. However, the coefficients are imprecisely 
estimated.
Overall, I find that VAM estimates line up 
very closely with estimates from lottery-based 
random assignment. For most commonly used 
VAM specifications, I cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that school effects are unbiased predictors 
of actual achievement. While this study offers 
hope that value-added modeling can be used to 
make inferences about school effectiveness, I 
conclude with a few cautionary notes.
First, while VAMs appear to be an unbiased 
predictor of student achievement, many other 
important outcomes of schooling are not mea-
sured here. Schools and teachers that are good 
at increasing student achievement may or may 
not be effective along other important dimen-
sions (e.g., Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2013; 
Deming et al. 2013; Jackson 2012). Second, 
this study uses a relatively small sample from a 
single school district. The proliferation of pub-
lic school choice and charter school lotteries 
across the United States provides an opportunity 
for researchers to test the accuracy of VAMs in 
8 Both methods of shrinkage adjustment attempt to esti-
mate a time-invariant school effect  μ j . Yet if some share of 
the yearly variance  θ jt in school effects comes from true dif-
ferences in effectiveness, then shrinkage that is based on 
the autocovariance of estimates will make school effects 
estimates too small. In the teacher effects literature, Chetty, 
Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) refer to this source of varia-
tion as “teacher bias.” When I use all prior years of data to 
form the VAM estimate, the empirical Bayes procedure used 
in Table 1 yields a reliability estimate of about 77 percent 
(1.237/1.601). The results here imply that a reliability of 93 
percent produces the best forecast (i.e., the coefficient that 
is closest to 1). However, this particular reliability estimate 
may not hold in other samples. 
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other settings. Finally, it should be noted that 
the “effects” of schools on student achievement 
arise from a combination of factors, only some 
of which are under the school’s control. VAM 
estimation does not uncover the mechanisms that 
underlie the production of student achievement, 
and variables such as peer influence and school 
context may have important influences indepen-
dent of the school’s actions (Raudenbush and 
Willms 1995; Todd and Wolpin 2003). For all 
these reasons, we should be cautious before mov-
ing toward policies that hold schools accountable 
for improving their “value added.”
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